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Abstract  
The paper identifies and analyses issues related to defining and evaluating so-called 
scientific imperialism. It discusses John Dupré’s account, suggesting it is overly 
conservative and does not offer a definition of scientific imperialism in not presenting it as 
a phenomenon of interdisciplinarity. It then discusses the recent account by Steve Clarke 
and Adrian Walsh, taking issue with ideas such as illegitimate occupation, counterfactual 
progress, and culturally significant values A more comprehensive and refined framework 
of my own is then summarized. It suggests types and aspects of scientific imperialism as a 
dynamic interdisciplinary relationship, distinguishing between imperialism of scope, style 
and standing, for example. It also suggests normative (ontological, epistemological, 
axiological and institutional) constraints on scientific imperialism. This enables to 
distinguish, in principle, recommendable from non-recommendable kinds of it, while 
recognizing the difficulties involved in trying to do this in practice.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘Imperialism’ is a term sometimes used for characterizing certain kinds of 
interdisciplinary relations in science. So we have physics imperialism, economics 
imperialism, and sometimes even sociology imperialism (but curiously, we usually don’t 
hear much talk about evolutionary imperialism, and even less about computational 
imperialism, neuroscientific imperialism, social constructivist imperialism, feminist 
imperialism, etc.). There has been relatively little philosophical writing on this phrase and 
the phenomenon it names, but the situation is now changing. 
 A philosophical account of ‘scientific imperialism’ should provide tools for 
defining the concept of it, for (descriptively) identifying cases of it, and for (normatively) 
evaluating it. As we will see, the task is not easy. This is not helped by the fact that 
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‘scientific imperialism’ has strong metaphorical connotations. One option would be to 
dispense with the term altogether and to conceptualize the relevant phenomena in some 
other terms. Given that the expression is already in use among practicing scientists, 
another option is to keep it and to explore whether some reasonable philosophical 
illumination can be given to it, answering the challenges of definition, identification, and 
evaluation. 
 Steven Clarke’s and Adrian Walsh’s recent article in this journal is rather rich in 
just these respects: it defines and describes scientific imperialism, and it also normatively 
explores ‘the proper relations between the sciences’ while also reflecting on the 
metaphoricality of ‘imperialism’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009). Their main target consists of a 
couple of publications by John Dupré in which Dupré both defines and denounces 
scientific imperialism (Dupré 1994, 2001). 
 I will first briefly examine the accounts and arguments put forth by Dupré and 
those by Clarke and Walsh. I will then outline and adjust my own account (e.g. Mäki 
2002a, 2009, 2012; Mäki and Marchionni 2011), showing how it might remedy some of 
the shortcomings of the other two. 
 
2. Dupré’s Account 
 
John Dupré is annoyed by two instances of what he terms scientific imperialism: 
evolutionary psychology and economics applied beyond its traditional boundaries. In 
arguing against these instances, he also attempts to offer a general account of scientific 
imperialism. But it turns out that he does not seem to talk about scientific imperialism as 
a relationship between scientific disciplines. 
 There are variations of Dupré’s general characterization, such as this one: ‘By 
scientific imperialism, I mean the tendency for a successful scientific idea to be applied 
far beyond its original home, and generally with decreasing success the more its 
application is expanded.’ (Dupré 2001, 16; emphasis added). An immediate observation 
about this version is that putting the definition in terms of success is ambiguous between 
very different kinds of success, including mere rhetorical and social success of an idea 
measured in terms of numbers of adherents. Now it is obvious that for the purpose of 
characterising and assessing scientific imperialism we need different notions of success, 
but we need to spell them out and keep them separate. 
 There are other versions that employ an epistemic notion of scientific 
performance, such as the one in terms of (still admittedly rather vague) ‘illumination’ that 
could be taken as a name for some sort explanatory performance, for example. Here is 
such a definition of ‘scientific imperialism’: ‘By this I mean the tendency to push a good 
scientific idea far beyond the domain in which it was originally introduced, and often far 
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beyond the domain in which it can provide much illumination.’ (Dupré 2001, 74). As an 
example, Dupré cites Dennett’s notion of ‘Darwin’s dangerous idea’, namely that of 
‘promising to unite and explain just about everything in one magnificent vision’ (Dennett 
1995, 82). 
 There are two ideas here, one descriptive, the other evaluative (the key words are 
in italics): 
 
[1] Scientific imperialism is: 
[a] the tendency to push a good scientific idea beyond the domain in which it was 
originally introduced; and 
[b] the tendency to push a scientific idea often far beyond the domain in which it 
can provide much illumination. 
 
So a scientific idea was originally introduced to deal with domain D1, and it turns out to 
be a good idea in that it provides illumination to that domain. The idea is then pushed ‘far 
beyond’ the original domain, to domains D2, D3, …, but the idea then ‘often’ loses its 
capacity to provide illumination and thereby becomes a bad idea in relation to these latter 
domains. I have a number of comments on this, hoping they will be useful in advancing 
the discussions.  
 First, the definition is silent about imperialism. There is nothing imperialistic per 
se in applying a scientific idea beyond its original domain of application. Formulation 
[1ab] says nothing about what is imperializing and what is being imperialized by such a 
move. In particular, it is quiet about the institutional side of the matter as it does not 
mention the role of established disciplines in claiming or occupying the domains that the 
imperializing discipline enters. So the immediate conclusion is that regardless of what 
Dupré’s intentions were, the definition does not give us a concept of scientific 
imperialism as a special kind of interdisciplinary relationship. 
 Second, pushing an idea ‘far beyond’ its original domain suggests a long distance 
between domains. But how long is long? What is the metric? How does one measure the 
distance? In particular, can the distance always be measured independently of the theories 
or explanatory principles that are being applied? Apple trees on Earth and some distant 
galaxies are indeed far away from one another measured in terms of kilometres. But the 
principles of Newtonian mechanism apply to both domains—provide illumination on 
them. So from the point of view of those principles themselves, there is no big distance 
between them at all. The two domains obey the same laws, so are of the same kind. Now 
if we were to take this—the extent to which the same principles apply, or illumination is 
provided—to measure the distance between the domains, then judgements of type [1b] 
become tautological: failure to illuminate becomes part of the definition of imperialism. 
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 Third, [1b] suggests that imperialistic expansion often leads to explanatory 
failure. I don’t think this sort of empirical evaluative element – the idea of frequent 
failure -- should be part of a general characterization of scientific imperialism. 
Empirically, it is likely that sometimes the expansion to new far-away domains is, and 
sometimes it is not, explanatorily successful. That it ‘often’ isn’t, should not be included 
in the definition of the very concept. Imperialistic expansion should not emerge as a 
likely failure by definition. Moreover, explanatory failure can, and does, occur on the 
home grounds of a discipline, so there is no intrinsic necessary connection between 
failure and adventurous expansion. 
 Fourth, taking a stance against scientific imperialism (Dupré 1994) would appear 
to mean a radical recommendation for extreme scientific caution. This indeed seems to 
propose staying on the safe home grounds where a theory was originally introduced. This 
would imply the advice to avoid taking epistemic risks involved in interdisciplinary 
trespassing. The implied rule says that if certain kinds of moves in scientific inquiry—
namely applying a scientific idea to far-away domains—often fail, they should not be 
attempted at all. Such a rule would be strongly against the ethos of scientific inquiry—
one of risk-taking intellectual adventure. I am sure Dupré does not endorse such 
implications. 
 Fifth, [1ab] talks about a ‘good’ scientific idea being applied beyond its original 
domain and thereby becoming bad (good –> bad). This seems unnecessarily restrictive. 
One of Dupré’s examples of an imperialistic discipline, conventional economics, is a case 
in point:  many critics of economics imperialism (controversially) argue that economics 
seeks to imperialistically impose ideas that are bad also in their original domain (bad –> 
bad). This sequence should not be ruled out by definition. 
 Sixth, there is another complaint about restricting the definition to originally 
‘good’ ideas. It is conceivable that an idea that is ‘bad’ in its original domain is applied 
beyond that domain, but this alone suggests nothing about whether the idea is good or 
bad in relation to some other distant domain.  An originally bad idea may turn out to be 
an excellent idea when applied to a new distant domain (bad –> good). 
 In addition to defining what scientific imperialism is, Dupré also hints at an 
explanation for why it fails, thereby supporting his normative judgement that it is not 
recommendable. The idea is that imperialistic science fails to secure a link between the 
idealizations of its models and the claims made about real phenomena (Dupré 2001, 134–
135). It is not clear why exactly this would provide sufficient grounds for resisting 
explanatory expansionism. Science can fail, and actually fails, in all sorts of domains 
regardless of their distance from the ‘original’ one (cf. Clarke and Walsh 2009, 198). 
Theories fail in their original home grounds, and they fail in other domains. And many of 
these failures are due to a poor contact between idealized models and messy reality. To 
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have a more reasonable argument, an obvious amendment is to incorporate a principle 
concerning likelihoods: the likelihood of failure grows with distance from the original 
domain. Provided this is construed in a non-tautological fashion, it might indeed be 
descriptively correct, but would it suffice as a justification for a normative proscription 
against scientific imperialism? No, it wouldn’t—because it would advise against risky 
intellectual endeavours. 
 It may be that evolutionary psychology and Gary Becker’s economics of the 
family—Dupré’s prime examples of scientific imperialism—are bad science. But it is not 
at all clear that they are bad simply because they are examples of interdisciplinary 
trespassing. Rather, they would be bad for the same reasons as disciplinary science may 
be bad: they do not meet the standards of good science (whatever these are). 
 It may be that meeting those standards becomes more difficult as the distance 
from the original domain grows. But there are other kinds of situation in which meeting 
the standards of good science may be particularly difficult. Think of early stages of a new 
research field, with very uncertain speculative theories and proliferating techniques, 
vacillating standards and multiple interpretations of research results, and so on. If Dupré 
were to advise against scientific imperialism because of the risks of failure, shouldn’t he 
also advise against launching new research avenues because they too are risky?  
 My overall suspicion is that Dupré’s account is too much inspired by his—and 
many others’—doubts about evolutionary psychology and expansive economics and that 
it therefore fails as a general account of scientific imperialism. His reasoning is guided 
and shaped by his opinions and intuitions about specific scientific substance and specific 
cases of intellectual expansion. These do not generalize smoothly. His discussion of those 
special cases involve implicit assumptions that, when made explicit, cannot easily be 
justified as generally valid. 
 
3. Clarke’s and Walsh’s Account 
 
Steven Clarke and Adrian Walsh (2009) say they share Dupré’s intuitions about the 
dangers of scientific imperialism, and they set out to articulate the reasons for holding 
those intuitions. Their focus is on normative evaluation, and they say little about what 
scientific imperialism is. They make progress, but as I will try to show, many problems 
remain. 
 Clarke and Walsh base their argument partly on an analogy between scientific and 
political imperialism. They examine the normative reasons for objecting to political 
imperialism and ask whether similar reasons ‘explain what is in fact objectionable about 
the colonisations of one area of scientific inquiry by another’. They suggest that  
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the normative force of the charge of imperialism in the philosophy of science is 
parasitic upon a general disapproval of political imperialism within our community 
at large. Many people believe that there is something morally wrong with political 
imperialism and, accordingly, if scientific disciplines are said to be imperialistic, 
then this is a prima facie ground for concern. (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 199) 
 
There are two observations to be made right away. The reasoning seems to suggest that 
first there was the label—‘imperialism’—and then emerged the disapproval in virtue of 
the analogy with political imperialism:  a particular interdisciplinary relationship is 
labelled as imperialism, prompting the association with political imperialism, so better to 
denounce it! One might as well expect it to have been the other way around—first 
disapproval due to some substantive reasons for perceived failure in interdisciplinary 
trespassing, then the label to convey the disapproval and perhaps to explain the failure. 
 My second observation questions the presumed normative connotations of 
‘imperialism’. Clarke and Walsh suggest that ‘imperialism’ is a pejorative term and 
therefore implicitly normative (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 195, 198). There is little doubt 
that the term is often used with normative associations. Yet I would disagree that it is 
always or necessarily used as a pejorative term. It is true that many people use the 
expression to indicate disapproval. It is, however, also often used by others, such as many 
economists, to indicate not just approval, but praise and even pride associated with 
successful imperialistic moves (e.g. Stigler 1984, Hirschleifer 1985, Lazear 2001; see 
Mäki 2009). These authors consider such moves a major scientific achievement and 
source of merit, evidence for the scientific quality of the imperializing discipline. These 
proud and self-congratulatory uses of the term ‘imperialism’ manifest what may be called 
the Kipling principle in the context of science: the superior discipline’s burden to bring 
scientific enlightenment to other disciplines, or at least to the study of other domains 
(there is a difference here that I will take up below). Many scientists subscribe to the 
Kipling principle, so see nothing illegitimate in scientific imperialism. 
 So it runs counter to these existent Kiplingian uses of ‘imperialism’ to define it as 
Clarke and Walsh do, as ‘the illegitimate occupation of another’s territory’ (Clarke and 
Walsh 2009, 199). We can turn this into a definition of scientific imperialism: 
 
[2] Scientific imperialism is the illegitimate occupation by one discipline of another 
discipline’s territory.  
 
This is an improvement compared to Dupré’s [1ab], in that [2] explicitly invokes the 
notion of discipline and gives a definition in terms of an interdisciplinary relationship. It 
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contains two notions that are not explicated: ‘territory of a discipline’ and ‘occupying a 
territory’. 
 Nevertheless, let us look at how Clarke and Walsh explicate the notion of 
illegitimate occupation. They identify three possible reasons for thinking of an 
occupation as illegitimate: [a] it violates local autonomy; [b] it exploits local colonised 
populations by ‘an unjust extraction of resources’; and [c] this exploitation ‘unfairly 
prevents the exploited from realising their potential to develop’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 
200, 201). 
 Of these three reasons for resistance, they rightly dissolve [a] as a non-problem: 
population ecology adopting new statistical techniques from mathematics and physics is 
just fine if this improves population ecology’s explanatory power. They also (partly) 
correctly reject [b] because ‘[p]hysicists do not typically go to chemistry … looking for 
resources to help solve problems in physics’—it is rather the other way around (but this 
requires qualifications due to the very notion of resource having a rather broad 
extension). This leaves [c] as their main target, as the major candidate for a normative 
basis for the opposition to scientific imperialism. They spell it out by distinguishing 
between two lines of argument. I will comment on them in turn. 
 
[c1] Colonisation by another discipline can cause a science to fail to progress in 
ways that it otherwise would progress. (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 201) 
 
This is a statement about what can be called counterfactual progress. In consequence of 
imperialism, the imperialized discipline will not progress in a way it would progress if 
not imperialized. I have a number of comments on this. They all derive from the fact that 
the normative force of [c1] depends on many of its details. 
 First, there is the issue of the incidence of progress. Argument [c1] talks only 
about progress in the colonized discipline. It is conceivable that the imperialistic science 
itself makes considerable progress in virtue of colonising others. The question then is: on 
what grounds would it be reasonable to sacrifice this opportunity by proscribing against 
imperialism? 
 Second, there is the related issue of kinds and degrees of progress. Even if it were 
the case that the imperialised discipline were to fail to progress ‘in ways that it otherwise 
would progress’, it is conceivable that these foregone ways are close to worthless, at most 
very minor steps of improvement. The imperialised discipline failing to progress ‘in ways 
that it otherwise would progress’ is consistent with there being considerable epistemic or 
other advancements in that discipline and elsewhere in the whole edifice of scientific 
knowledge. These latter gains might easily compensate for those foregone minor losses. 
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It is indeed conceivable that scientific imperialism brings about overall net progress in 
science as a whole. This provides one way of resolving possible local tradeoffs. 
 Third, there is a second issue of the incidence of progress. Even if it were the case 
that imperialism ‘can’ inhibit progress in the imperialised discipline, it is also conceivable 
that it does just the opposite, namely it enhances progress in that discipline. The ways in 
which this may happen are many, of which the implementation of the Kipling principle is 
just one. The recipient discipline may acquire better techniques of inquiry, it may be 
forced to critically examine and improve the basic presuppositions of its theories, and so 
on. 
 Indeed, one should not proceed on the undisputed premise that scientific 
imperialism necessarily has damaging effects on the recipient disciplines. I would suggest 
that whether it does is a contingent and contextual matter, thus there is no one general 
pattern. A very important possible scenario is one in which scientific progress in some 
field is hampered by a local disciplinary monopoly, and that an effective way of breaking 
such a harmful monopoly is for another discipline to make an imperialistic intrusion. So 
when Clarke and Walsh consider the possibility that due to imperialism ‘we end up 
accepting inferior explanations, or failing to investigate possibly superior explanatory 
alternatives’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 202), I’d remind them of an alternative scenario in 
which, due to no imperialism, local disciplinary monopolies prevent scientists from 
exploring possibly superior alternatives, and therefore an imperialist intrusion may give a 
discipline a chance to break out from such shackles.  
 Fourth, there is an issue of disciplinary structure. Clarke and Walsh discuss as a 
possible consequence of scientific imperialism that ‘valuable “indigenous knowledge” 
that might otherwise be gained, may be overlooked and valuable indigenous knowledge 
that has already been gained may be lost’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 202). As a 
consolation, I would like to point out that in such situations, real-world interdisciplinary 
dynamics sometimes generate new sub-fields or schools of inquiry that store and create 
such threatened bodies of knowledge (it is of course also possible that this will not 
happen and that there will be a permanent loss of ‘indigenous knowledge’). In general, 
what this point underlines is that disciplinary structures and boundaries are not fixed and 
stable, they rather adjust in ever-new ways as the circumstances change. This is an 
important observation that has not been sufficiently acknowledged in the accounts 
discussed here. 
 In their discussion of [c1], Clarke and Walsh imply an important distinction 
between ‘success’ and ‘explanatory virtue’ when they challenge the opponents to 
scientific imperialism to convince us that  
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[c1a] there is a danger that imperialistic ideas are liable to succeed in the 
disciplines they attempt to colonise, despite their lack of explanatory virtue. 
(Clarke and Walsh 2009, 202) 
 
Here recall that, of the two definitions by Dupré that I cited above, one was in terms of 
success, the other in terms of explanatory performance (as I interpreted ‘illumination’). 
By ‘success’ of an idea Clarke and Walsh presumably mean things such as its wide 
adoption and use. I have two comments on this. 
 First, [c1a] is put in terms of danger and liability (and it even makes them 
connected in that the danger is presented as a second-order property of the first-order 
liability!). This makes the claim more likely to be true. But again, this truth has little 
normative force as mere danger or risk of a bad outcome cannot be a sufficient reason for 
proscribing against scientific imperialism. Risk taking is a mark of good science. 
 Second, Clarke and Walsh give an explanation for why the danger suggested by 
[c1a] might materialise. It is not because members of the potentially colonised disciplines 
are ‘naive dupes who are liable to fall for the illusory charms of inferior explanations’ but 
rather because ‘intelligent researchers’ adopt those explanations since they ‘have proved 
to be fruitful elsewhere’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 202). In response to this, I would say I 
find any sole focus on these sorts of factors a little too individualistic and too epistemic. 
Instead, I would suggest a more comprehensive array of possible causes of the adoption 
of inferior explanations by pointing to  institutional matters such as intellectual fashion, 
disciplinary status, competition for resources, etc. 
 Let us then consider their second way of justifying the opposition to scientific 
imperialism: ‘colonisation by another discipline may lead scientists to fail to appreciate 
values that are relevant to their discipline’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 201–202). This 
formulation gives the impression that actually existing disciplines and their characteristic 
values are among the ultimate sacred givens, so whatever threatens them is thereby 
suspect. But what Clarke and Walsh apparently mean after all is a broader set of values 
that have general cultural significance and that are somehow expressed by an endangered 
discipline. So a defensible reformulation might go: 
 
[c2] Colonisation by another discipline may lead scientists in the colonised 
discipline to fail to appreciate human values of general cultural significance.  
 
As an example, Clarke and Walsh discuss the traditional concern about economics 
imperialism. The concern is that the spread of methods such as cost–benefit analysis and 
concepts such as the market to the human sciences will ‘undermine traditional (and 
valued) ways of relating to one another’ (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 203–204). They say 
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this is more plausible in defending the human sciences against the imperialistic incursions 
of economics and evolutionary psychology than against imperialism between two or more 
natural sciences. 
 My comment here is similar to what I said above about Dupré’s account. The 
argument is closely linked to specific disciplines and their specific current contents and 
relations, so does not say much of general validity about scientific imperialism. Indeed, 
as a generalisation (without ‘may’), [c2] fails. Clarke and Walsh consider the possibility 
of failing to appreciate the full range of human values in consequence of scientific 
imperialism (by economics and evolutionary psychology). I can think of situations that 
are the exact opposite. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that a discipline based on a full 
appreciation of human values invades one that is not so based, and that this results in a 
fuller appreciation of such values in the recipient discipline. Think of, say, Nazi science 
being so invaded (with the help of changes in larger circumstances), or what some 
consider ‘inhuman’ economics being invaded by various humanistic disciplines. I would 
suggest such cases should not be excluded from the scope of scientific imperialism by 
definition. 
 Let me summarize my criticisms of Clarke’s and Walsh’s account by responding 
to their own summary of their two main arguments: 
 
[i] If instances of scientific imperialism were to lead to the adoption of explanations 
that are inferior to those that would have otherwise been adopted, then these should 
be resisted. (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 205) 
 
Response: Scientific imperialism is neither sufficient nor necessary for such poor 
explanations. It does not have to lead to such explanations, and there are other 
developments that can lead to them. Any developments in science that are found to lead 
to such inferior explanations should be resisted. Importantly, finding out about such an 
inadvisable development should be a matter of empirical discovery, not of a priori 
judgement.  
  
[ii] In the human sciences, scientific imperialism raises an additional concern, 
which is that important human values could fail to be expressed, and we might 
become the sorts of people that, on reflection, we would not wish to have become. 
(Clarke and Walsh 2009, 205) 
 
Response: Again, this concern should not be restricted to scientific imperialism. 
Imperialism does not necessarily have such consequences, and the suppression of 
important human values may as well take place within some human science disciplines 
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without any imperialistic intrusions. Once we discover such developments, wherever, we 
should resist them because of their unwanted consequences, not because they may be due 
to scientific imperialism. 
 
4. My Account 
 
Scientific disciplines are institutional structures that have sometimes been considered in 
analogy to nations and countries, which makes it tempting to consider scientific 
imperialism as an interdisciplinary relationship in analogy to imperialism between 
countries. But it is well known that the latter notion is not a simple and easy one. No 
wonder then that the challenge of scientific imperialism to the philosophy of science is 
rather demanding for several reasons. It is a complex and fluid phenomenon with both 
institutional and epistemic aspects and a variety of types and dimensions – and hard-to-
classify boundary cases. This is why no single compact definition can be given and why 
its empirical identification and normative evaluation tend to be so difficult. In previous 
work, I have tried to disentangle some of these types and dimensions as well as to outline 
some normative principles for assessing them (see Mäki 2002a, 2002b, 2009; Mäki and 
Marchionni 2011). 
 
4.1. Kinds and Aspects 
 
One relevant division is between issues of scope, style, and standing. These highlight 
different aspects of the interdisciplinary relations at stake. 
 
Imperialism of scope. An expansionist discipline seeks to explain phenomena that 
belong to the perceived domain of another discipline. This is the pursuit of 
explanatory unification that is disrespectful for disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Imperialism of style. The styles and strategies of research, such as the techniques 
and standards of inquiry and communication, characteristic of one discipline, are 
transferred to, or imposed on, other disciplines. 
 
Imperialism of standing. The academic and non-academic prestige, power, and 
resources as well as the acknowledged technological and political relevance of 
one discipline increase at the expense of those of another. 
 
 It is useful to start with issues of scope. This is also Dupré’s point of departure. It 
is important to see what is and what is not imperialism in regard to scope. Mere scientific 
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expansionism is simply a matter of applying a scientific idea developed within a 
discipline to new domains of phenomena. Explanatory unification of the old and new 
domains may result, but no interdisciplinary issues are at stake since the explanandum 
phenomena are not defined in disciplinary terms. Note that Dupré’s definition [1ab] 
literally taken only deals with non-imperialist expansionism in this sense. 
 One may set out to oppose expansionism directly by simply questioning the 
possibility or desirability of unification in general, perhaps on general metaphysical 
grounds. Or one may resist particular instances of expansionism for local reasons of lack 
of fit of the theory with the new domain. Much of what Dupré writes seems to fall into 
these categories. 
 Expansionism turns into a form of imperialism once the new domains are defined 
in disciplinary terms, suggesting that they ‘belong to’ the ‘territory’ that is already 
‘occupied’ by another discipline. ‘Belonging’ and ‘occupying’ are not easy concepts to 
analyze in this context, but we can take them to include situations such as those in which 
the other discipline’s ‘identity’ is being partly constituted by having those phenomena in 
its explanatory purview, or in which it has made regular attempts to explain those 
phenomena, or at least has programmatically defined its scope so as to include them. 
 The weakest and most innocent version of imperialism of scope is one in which 
the expansionist discipline simply sets out to explain phenomena in domains belonging to 
other disciplines while ignoring these disciplines themselves. This is domain-only 
imperialism that directly addresses new phenomena and bypasses disciplines that claim 
those phenomena as ‘theirs’. There is no intrusion into other disciplinary cultures and 
practices. Much of perceived scientific imperialism is of this kind. 
 Because there is no direct interdisciplinary encounter in the domain-only case, it 
is not always clear how the explanations provided by the two disciplines are related. 
Supposing the discipline previously claiming the domain has actually developed 
explanations of phenomena in the domain, the explanations offered by the imperialistic 
discipline of the same domain can be rival or complementary in relation to them (cf. 
Mäki 2002). Naturally, rivalry in explanations pose a more serious challenge to the other 
discipline, so we can say this gives a stronger form of domain-only imperialism than the 
complementary explanations case. 
 Disciplinary imperialism is more far-reaching and intrusive than the domain-only 
variety in that other disciplines – and not just ‘their’ domains - are targeted. It features 
either imperialism of style or that of standing, or both. Disciplines are institutional 
structures that involve conventions and convictions, standards and strategies, ideals and 
identities, principles and practices, styles and statuses, rules and resources, ordinances 
and organizations. Disciplinary imperialism challenges the disciplinary institutions of the 
imperialized disciplines. Challenge can take many forms, from careful and respectful 
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argument to arrogant dismissal and divestment of academic resources. 
 Such various kinds of imperialism can also be variously related to one another. 
For example, issues of style and scope do not have to be closely linked. Domain-only 
imperialism may proceed—at least initially—without disciplinary imperialism. Likewise, 
disciplinary imperialism of style can proceed without imperialism of scope: methods and 
strategies characteristic of one discipline may travel to another discipline without an 
attempt to explain phenomena in the domain of the latter in terms of theories in the 
former. On the other hand, there may be mutually reinforcing connections. The rivalry 
version of domain-only imperialism may in due time lead to disciplinary imperialism. 
The likelihood of success of an imperialism of style by an intruding discipline may be 
fortified by a high standing of that discipline. And so on. 
 Scientific imperialism can be driven externally or internally (to the recipient 
discipline), that is, it can be driven by the imperializers or by the imperialized, or by both. 
The imperializers can be motivated by a strong disciplinary confidence in the power and 
superiority of their own theories and research styles, perhaps by a feeling of a justified 
Kipling principle. The imperialized may be willing to adopt ideas from elsewhere 
because they perceive their own discipline to be deficient in one way or another, such as 
lacking powerful theories and methods, or unity. For example, much of the impact of 
economics on political science and biology seems to be based on such internal 
dissatisfactions within the latter disciplines. 
One final observation I want to make here is that a too holistic account of 
scientific imperialism can often be misleading. Disciplines—both at the giving and 
receiving ends—typically are not fully uniform and unified wholes but rather more or 
less—in some cases more, in some others less—fragmented and changing structures with 
various components that are rigid or flexible in different degrees (cf. Davis 2012). We 
can try to express this in various ways, one of which is to draw a rough distinction, or 
perhaps rather a continuum, between imperialism and colonialism (note that Clarke and 
Walsh talk about ‘colonisation’ but do not draw the distinction). While imperialism 
would be a matter of wholesale conquest of another discipline or its domain, colonialism 
would be a matter of retail conquest, one of establishing limited intellectual ‘colonies’ 
into the structure of the recipient discipline. Most of what is considered scientific 
imperialism is colonialism in this sense. For example, one might say that neuroscience 
has colonized small parts of economics, and economics has colonized parts of 
neuroscience. It is clear that the dimension suggested here complicates the task of 
descriptive identification—how to draw a line between imperialism and colonialism—as 
well as the task of normative evaluation—wholesale imperialism easily appears more 
suspect than retail colonialism, but the reasons are not easy to spell out. 
 
 14 
4.2. Constraints and Chances of Progress 
 
Defining the concept of scientific imperialism and identifying its actual instances are not 
easy. This does not make its normative evaluation any easier. 
 Again, let us begin with imperialism of scope. This gives us an epistemic notion 
of scientific progress, one of advancement in knowledge, including explanatory 
knowledge about the world: growth of explanatory unification. Might scientific 
imperialism on some conditions help make epistemic progress in this sense? I approach 
this question in terms of constraints on the pursuit of explanatory unification across 
disciplinary boundaries. 
 The first constraint is ontological. The desired accomplishment is ontological 
unification of apparently diverse kinds of phenomena. The pursuit of unification in its 
ontological mode is a legitimate process of discovery of the extent to which there is unity 
in the world itself: the extent to which parts of the world are made of similar components, 
governed by similar laws, or generated by similar causal mechanisms, and so on. The 
only way to find out about the limits to this ontic unity is to try to unify as far as possible, 
regardless of whether disciplinary boundaries are being crossed. Disciplinary boundaries 
appear just as arbitrary institutional artefacts that should not impose any obstacles to this 
endeavour. So the first constraint on scientific imperialism is that it should be based on 
the pursuit of ontological unification (in contrast to mere derivational unification, that of 
deriving as many explanandum sentences as possible from a maximally parsimonious set 
of explanans sentences or a simple explanatory scheme without any ontological 
commitments; see Mäki 1990; for further issues, see Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2010). 
 The second constraint is epistemological. No assurance of achieved ontological 
unification can ever be perfect, and in many cases it falls short of perfection by a vast 
margin. Often a great deal of epistemic caution is advisable when accepting and rejecting 
theories and explanations both on the home grounds of a discipline and in far away 
territories. Especially in the social and human sciences, radical uncertainties derive from 
situations of uncontrollable underdetermination (which can be more easily hidden by 
skilful manipulations of auxiliary assumptions if mere derivational unification were 
pursued). Any imperialistic claims about the cross-disciplinary unity of phenomena must 
be accompanied by explicitly stated careful provisos rather than hidden uncertainties.  
 The third constraint is axiological. This is where non-epistemic values come in. 
Achievements and failures in unification must be weighed in terms of the importance or 
significance of the unified phenomena. Importance is relative to human interests and 
values of various kinds -- from practical to moral and cultural – as well as to specific 
community and context. Theories that unify insignificant phenomena while (or in virtue 
of) ignoring or marginalizing significant ones are much less supportable than those that 
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unify significant phenomena at the expense of less significant ones. The concern about 
important human values failing to be expressed and even being suppressed in 
consequence of scientific imperialism (as in Clarke’s and Walsh’s account) is part of the 
motivation for putting forth the axiological constraint. 
 The fourth constraint is institutional. The pursuit of cross-disciplinary unification 
should proceed under the guidance of the rules and regulations of appropriately virtuous 
scientific practice. The optimal institutions of good science should advice for respectful 
humility and against dismissive hegemonic arrogance in the relations between disciplines. 
They would support critical and open conversational culture as well as sufficient degrees 
of diversity and tolerance, while proscribing against closed dogmatism and uniform 
intellectual monopolies protected by non-argumentative means of exclusion. Imperialism 
that proceeds by engaging in open debate and by spelling out and defending its 
presuppositional posits is more acceptable than imperialism that succeeds merely or 
mostly by relying on the academic and non-academic standing of the imperialistic 
discipline. 
 Within an appropriate institutional framework, there is little reason to worry about 
imperialistic trespassing. Scientists can be encouraged to take epistemic risks that are 
involved in attempted interdisciplinary expansion or invasion, as this would be a matter 
of ordinary trial and error in the pursuit of epistemic progress. In the case of error—
failure to ontologically unify with strong epistemic and axiological warrants—
imperialists would retreat to their home grounds. On the other hand, success that meets 
the constraints constitutes progress and should not be objected, since important 
discoveries about the extent of the unity of the world can be made. Disciplinary 
imperialism of style in conformity with the above constraints can lead to fruitful debates 
between the participant disciplines and their subfields, resulting in better methods, more 
rigorous standards etc. in the recipient discipline—and perhaps the discovery of flaws and 
heretofore ignored opportunities on the home grounds of the imperialising discipline. 
 
4.3. Back to Issues of Definition and Identification 
 
The framework outlined above helps to see more clearly the difficulty of the issues of 
definition and identification. First, there are two alternative lines of definitional strategy. I 
have suggested a way of distinguishing between good and bad scientific imperialism in 
terms of normative constraints, but imperialism itself is defined neutrally in terms of 
scope, style and standing in interdisciplinary relations. Instances of imperialism are 
rendered acceptable and even desirable if they meet the above set of four constraints. An 
obvious alternative way of defining scientific imperialism is also within the framework, 
but it would restrict the concept to what I’ve presented as bad versions. So on this 
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alternative definition, only attempts at interdisciplinary trespassing that violate the 
ontological, epistemological, axiological and/or institutional constraints would qualify as 
scientific imperialism. On this normative definition, scientific imperialism is always to be 
resisted. 
 Second, what does it take to empirically identify instances of scientific 
imperialism—or good and bad versions of it—on these definitions? The difficulty of 
answering this question derives from the difficulty of judging whether the above four 
constraints are actually met or violated by instances of interdisciplinary trespassing. 
Meeting the constraints cannot be an on–off matter, one rather should judge whether the 
constraints are met in a sufficiently close proximity to the ideal perfection, or else 
violated in a too serious manner. Any actual situation will violate the ideals to some 
extent, so the challenge is to judge whether the violations are small enough to be 
negligible. This is no easy task, and many such judgements will be contestable. As should 
be clear, the above two definitional solutions must face this challenge, and neither of 
them is superior to its alternative in being able to escape the problem of estimating actual 
degrees of constraint violation. 
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